Mirror of Time: Temporality and Contemporaneity in the work of Jorge Luis Borges by Donnelly, Jennifer
Vol 2, No 1 (2012)   |   ISSN 2155-1162 (online)   |   DOI 10.5195/contemp.2012.38 
http://contemporaneity.pitt.edu 
 
Mirror of Time 
Temporality and Contemporaneity in the Work of 
Jorge Luis Borges 
Jennifer Donnelly 
Abstract  
Jorge Luis Borges recognized the cracking facade of modernity and the fragility of its monist 
absolutisms, its commitment to linearity, and its faith in historical progress. By disavowing 
the ability of time to be contained within any collective structure of representation, Borges 
both refutes modernist conceptions of time and offers insight into recent theories of 
contemporaneity. A contemporaneous reading of Borges opens lucid temporal relationships, 
challenges assumptions about the affinities between the self and time, allows for the 
existence of multiple temporal antimonies, and ultimately reveals the contemporaneous 
relationship between individual sensations of time of the collective structural composition of 
temporality. 
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Between 1939 and 1945, the absolutist ideologies 
and insurmountable cultural, political, and 
economic tensions of the industrialized world 
erupted into global war. During this period, Jorge 
Luis Borges published Tlön, Uqbar, Orbis Tertius 
(1940), The Garden of Forking Paths (1941), and A 
New Refutation of Time (1944-1946). Like many of 
his contemporaries, Borges recognized the 
cracking facade of modernity and the fragility of its 
monist absolutisms, its commitment to linearity, 
and its faith in historical progress. Borges refutes 
modernist conceptions of time by disavowing the ability of time to be contained within any 
collective structure of representation. Furthermore, Borgesian time is illuminating for recent 
theories of contemporaneity, because it opens lucid temporal relationships, challenges 
assumptions about the affinities between the self and time, and allows for the existence of 
multiple temporal antimonies.1 Therefore, I propose a reading of The Garden of Forking 
Paths, Tlön, Uqbar, Orbis Tertius, and A New Refutation of Time based on Borges’ theories of 
temporality. Borges’ nonlinearity, idealism, and anti-monism reveal not only his negation of 
modernist absolutisms, but also the contemporaneous relationship between inherent 
individual sensations of time of the collective structural composition of temporality.  
The Garden of Forking Paths 
Dr. Yu Tsen, a Chinese spy for the Germany army, realizes that he will soon be 
murdered. His enemy is in pursuit, and he alone holds an important military secret for the 
Chief. Dr. Yu Tsen flees. In his terror, he has a moment of clarity about temporal 
instantaneousness, and the (seemingly) unconditional singularity and individuality of time. 
There can be only one moment of actuality (happening now) in reference to all other 
moments of actuality (not happening now), and there is only one experience of selfhood, in 
reference to all other selfhoods: “Then I reflected that all things happen, happen to one, 
 
1 This essay deals with a narrow subject within the philosophy of time: the refutation of linear time and 
the emergence of contemporaneity and multiple theories of time over the course of the twentieth-century 
as a reaction against the universal, progress-oriented modernist theories of time of the early twentieth-
century. I am concerned with the way in which Borges refutes modernist theories of time in his essays, 
and therefore I primarily cite authors who focus on Borges’ philosophy of time. For information on the 
literary interpretation and meaning of Borges’ oeuvre, see Beatrix Sarlo, Jorge Luis Borges: A Writer on 
the Edge, ed. by John King (London: Verso, 1993), Daniel Balderston, Out of Context: Historical Reference 
and the Representation of Reality (Durham: Duke University Press, 1993), and Sylvia Malloy, Signs of 
Borges, trans. by Oscar Montero (Durham: Duke University Press, 1994). For theoretical discussions of 
Borges’ philosophy of time see Ana María Barrenechea, Borges: The Labyrinth Maker, trans. by Robert 
Lima (New York: New York University Press, 1965), Shlomith Rimmon-Kenan, “Doubles and Counterparts: 
Patterns of Interchangeability in Borges’ The Garden of Forking Paths,” Critical Inquiry, 6, No. 4 (Summer 
1980): 639-647, Robert L. Chibka, “The Library of Forking Paths,” Special Issue: The New Erudition 
(Autumn, 1996): 106-122, W.H. Bossart, Borges and Philosophy: Self, Time, and Metaphysics (New York: 
Peter Lang Publishing, 2003), Kate Jenckes, Reading Borges after Benjamin (Albany: Suny Press, 2007), 
and Stefan Herbrechter and Ivan Callas, editors, Cy-Borges (Lewisburg: Bucknell University Press, 2009). 
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precisely now. Century follows century, and things happen only in the present. There are 
countless men in the air, on land and at sea, and all that really happens happens to me.”2 
Dr. Yu Tsen finds in a telephone book the address of the only man who can help him. He 
departs immediately by train for the village Ashgrove, narrowly escaping his enemy on the 
train platform. Uncannily, a group of children direct him towards his destination as he steps 
off the train. Taking every left fork, Dr. Yu Tsen advances toward the house of Dr. Albert, 
while ruminating on the work of his great-grandfather, Ts’ui Pên, the author of a lengthy, 
incomprehensible novel, The Garden of Forking Paths, and the builder of a labyrinth that has 
never been found. At the gate of the home of Dr. Albert, Dr. Yu Tsen is unwittingly led 
through a garden to the missing work of his ancestor, now in the possession of his host. Dr. 
Albert had discovered that Ts’ui Pên’s novel and his labyrinth were one in the same: a work 
of time that omits any mention time. After sharing the ancestral text, Dr. Yu Tsen murders 
Dr. Albert with a single shot. He is shortly arrested, and a story runs in the papers about the 
mysterious murder of Dr. Albert by Yu Tsen. The Chief, however, interprets the message and 
the English city named Albert is bombed the following day. Moments before his murder, Dr. 
Albert revealed about the work of Ts’ui Pên:  
The Garden of Forking Paths is a picture, incomplete yet not false, of the universe such as 
Ts’ui Pên conceived it to be. Differing from Newton and Schopenhauer, your ancestor did 
not think of time as absolute and uniform. He believed in an infinite series of times, in a 
dizzily growing ever-spreading network of diverging, converging, and parallel times. This 
web of time- the strands of which approach one another, bifurcate, intersect, or ignore 
each other through the centuries- embraces every possibility. We do not exist in most of 
them. In some you exist and not I, while in others I do, and you do not, and in yet others 
both of us exist. In this one, in which chance has favored me, you have come to my gate. 
In another, you, crossing the garden, have found me dead. In yet another, I say these 
very same words, but am an error, a phantom.3 
The Kafkaesque triad of time, referring to Kafka’s parable of man struggling between the 
antagonistic past and future, is ruptured in Borgesian time into innumerable possible and 
imaginary pasts and futures: converging, diverging, running parallel, repeating and bearing 
 
2 Jorge Luis Borges, “The Garden of Forking Paths” in Ficciones, ed. Anthony Kerrigan (New York: Grove 
Press, 1962), 90. Translated from Jorge Luis Borges, “El Jardín de Senderos que se Bifurcan,” in Ficciones 
(Buenos Aires: Emercé Editores, S.A., 1956): “Después reflexioné que todas las cosas le suceden a uno 
precisamente, precisamente ahora. Siglos de siglos y sólo en el presente ocurren los hechos; 
innumerables hombres en el aire, en la tierra y el mar, y todo lo que realmente pasa mi pasa a mí...” 
3 Borges, “The Garden of Forking Paths,” 100: “El jardín de senderos que se bifurcan es una imagen 
incompleta, pero no falsa, del universo tal como lo concebía Ts’ui Pên. A diferencia de Newton y de 
Schopenhauer, su antepasado no creía en un tiempo uniforme, absoluto. Creía en infinitas series de 
tiempos divergentes, convergentes y paralelos. Esa trama de tiempos que se aproximan, se bifurcan, se 
cortan o que secularmente se ignoran, abarca todas las posibilidades. No existimos en la mayoría des esos 
tiempos; en algunos existe usted y no yo; en otros, yo, no usted; en otros, los dos. En éste, que un 
favorable azar me depara, usted ha llegado a mi casa; en otro, usted, al atravesar el jardín, me ha 
encontrado muerto; en otro, yo digo estas mismas palabras, pero soy un error, un fantasma.” 
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down on the moment of what “happens happens to me.”4  In The Garden of Forking Paths, 
self-affirmation is bound between the uniqueness of each passing moment and the time-
negating endlessness of repetition, which concurrently “disintegrates and defines the self.”5 
The nonlinear relationship between two temporal moments in a successive series is evident 
by the indisputable presence of repetition, and therefore the possibility of linear time is 
nullified for Borges. Linear history is a fiction, a futile attempt to carve a sense of reference 
for what “happens happens to me” out the vast expanse of limitless time. The negation of 
linear time bursts the floodgates of temporality, allowing for nearly infinite possibilities of 
divergent, convergent, and parallel times.  
Tlön, Uqbar, Orbis Tertius 
In Tlön, Uqbar, Orbis Tertius, Borges narrates the story of a puzzling encyclopedia entry 
concerning the land of Uqbar. Borges and his colleagues search exhaustively for information 
on the illusive Uqbar in order to determine its reality or unreality. Their knowledge is of 
Uqbar is dependent on a single obscure article in one copy of the Anglo-American Cyclopedia, 
1917, which only obliquely remarks that the literature of Uqbar refers not to reality, but only 
to the imaginary regions of Tlön and Mlejnas. After the death of a family friend, Borges 
discovers The First Encyclopedia of Tlön in the deceased man’s belongings, and is able to 
unlock the mystery of Tlön. 
In the realm of Tlön, “the world is not a concurrence of objects in space, but a 
heterogeneous series of independent acts. It is serial and temporal, but not spatial.”6 The 
Tlönians lack any structural association between the cognitive, temporal world and the 
material, spatial world: “they do not conceive of the spatial as everlasting in time.” 7 Like The 
Garden of Forking Paths, Tlön, Uqbar, Orbis Tertius symbolizes the arbitrary order imposed 
upon human experience.8 In the anachronistic postscript of Tlön, Uqbar, Orbis Tertius, dated 
1947 (the story was originally published in 1940) Borges reveals both that Tlön was an 
imaginary world created by a secret group of scholars, but that since 1940, Tlön entered 
reality, and was sweeping through society at an astonishing rate. In Tlön, Uqbar, Orbis 
 
4 Kafka’s parable: “He has two antagonists: the first presses him from behind, from the origin. The second 
blocks the road ahead. He gives battle to both. To be sure, the first supports him in his fight with the 
second, for he wants to push him forward, and in the same way the second supports him in his fight with 
the first, since he drives him back. But it is only theoretically so. For it is not only the two antagonists who 
are there, but he himself as well, and who really knows his intentions? His dream, though, is that some 
time in an unguarded moment- and this would require a night darker than any night has ever been yet- 
he will jump out of the fighting line and be promised, on account of his experience in fighting, to the 
position of umpire over his antagonists in their fight with each other.” Quoted from Hannah Arendt, 
Between Past and Future: Eight Exercises in Political Thought (New York: Viking, 1961), 7. 
5 Shlomith Rimmon-Kenan, “Doubles and Counterparts: Patterns of Interchangeability in Borges’ The 
Garden of Forking Paths,” Critical Inquiry, 6, No. 4 (Sumer 1980): 640. 
6 Jorge Luis Borges, “Tlön, Uqbar, Orbis Tertius” in Ficciones, ed. Anthony Kerrigan (New York: Grove 
Press, 1962), 23. Translated from Jorge Luis Borges, “Tlön, Uqbar, Orbis Tertius” in Ficciones (Buenos 
Aires: Emercé Editores, S.A., 1956): “Elle mundo para ellos no es un concurso de objetos en el espacio; 
es una serie heterogénea de actos independientes. Es sucesivo, temporal, no espacial.” 
7 Borges, “Tlön, Uqbar, Orbis Tertius,” 24: “No conciben que lo espacial perdure en le tiempo.” 
8 W. H. Bossart, Borges and Philosophy: Self, Time, and Metaphysics (New York: Peter Lang Publishing, 
2003), 106. 
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Tertius, Borges blends “fictional and material manifestations of the real” seamlessly until the 
meaning of one is lost without the other.9  
A New Refutation of Time 
In A New Refutation of Time, Borges consolidates his ideas about the illusionary nature 
of time in two philosophical treatises. As in The Garden of Forking Paths, he denies the 
existence of linear time based on the assumption that a single instance of repetition destroys 
the successive sequence of time: “Is not one single repeated term enough to disrupt and 
confound the history of the world, to reveal that there is no such history?”10 In the end, 
however, Borges concedes that his refutations are unsatisfactory, and acknowledges that the 
denial of temporal succession only leads one back into time:  
And yet, and yet…To deny temporal succession, to deny the self, to deny the 
astronomical universe, appear to be acts of desperation and our secret consolations. Our 
destiny (unlike the hell of Swedenborg and the hell of Tibetan mythology) is not terrifying 
because it is unreal; it is terrifying because it is irreversible and iron-bound. Time is the 
substance of which I am made. Time is a river that sweeps me along, but I am the river; 
it is a tiger that mangles me, but I am the tiger; it is a fire that consumes me, but I am 
the fire. The world, unfortunately is real, and I, unfortunately, am Borges.11 
Therefore, on contradictory terms, Borges seems to accept, despite his refutation, the 
existence of collective structures of time and the position of the self as embedded in such 
constructions. Borges has simultaneously established that time is not temporally successive, 
and that temporal succession is not unreal (and therefore time is not not temporally 
successive.) According to Kate Jenckes in Reading Borges after Benjamin, Borges does not 
necessarily negate time, but instead asserts there is more to temporality than the conception 
of time as a continuum that is accessible to cognition.12 In other words, Borges attempts to 
unlock the concurrent existence of multiple temporalities both within and beyond the limits of 
comprehension. For Borges, the self not only constructs the past and the present as 
successive temporal moments, but also deconstructs succession in order to rebuild it, in an 
unending cycle of self-referentiality. As Borges has shown, it is not enough to look backward 
at what has been and forward at what will be; time is not a line, but a web. 
 
9 Gordon Calleja, “Of Mirrors, Encyclopedias, and the Virtual” in Cy-Borges, ed. Stefan Herbrechter and 
Ivan Callus (Lewisburg: Bucknell University Press, 2009), 92. 
10 Jorge Luis Borges, “A New Refutation of Time” in On Mysticism, ed. Suzanne Jill Levine (New York: 
Penguin Books, 2010), 75. Translation of “Nueva Refutación de Tiempo” reprinted from Borges, Jorge Luis. 
Selected Non-Fictions, trans. by Suzanne Levine and Eliot Weinberger. New York: Penguin Books, 1999: 
“¿No basta un solo término repetido para desbaratar y confundir la historia del mundo, para denunciar que 
no hay tal historia?” 
11 Borges, “A New Refutation of Time,” 77: “And yet, and yet...Negar la sucesión temporal, negar el yo, 
negar el universo astronómico, son desesperaciones aparentes y consuelos secretos. Nuestro destino (a 
diferencia del infierno de Swedenborg y del infierno de la mitología tibetana) no es espantoso por irreal; 
es espantoso porque es irreversible y de hierro. El tiempo es la substancia de que estoy hecho. El tiempo 
es un río que me arrebata, pero yo soy el río; es un tigre que me destroza, pero yo soy el tigre; es un 
fuego que me consume, pero yo soy el fuego. El mundo, desgraciadamente, es real; desgraciadamente, 
soy Borges.” 
12 Kate Jenckes, Reading Borges after Benjamin (Albany: Suny Press, 2007), 118. 
8 0  M i r r o r  o f  T i m e  
 
Contemporaneity: Historical Presence in Visual Culture   http://contemporaneity.pitt.edu 
Vol 2, No 1 (2012)   |   ISSN 2155-1162 (online)   |   DOI 10.5195/contemp.2012.38 
In order to distinguish the moment “happening now” from all other moments “not 
happening now,” and thus assert that what “happens happens to me,” referentiality is built 
out of future presents and past presents in order to locate the eternal present inside of time. 
Borges continually refutes the domination of linear constructions of time for other 
temporalities that exist beyond representation. Representational limitations, for Borges, do 
not reconcile individual sensations of time with collective constructions of time. Jenckes 
elucidates Borges’ distinction between an idealist conception of history “inside our heads,” 
and a materialist conception of history “outside our heads,” as a discernment of the limits 
and capabilities of representation: “What lies outside of representations of linearity and 
identity are often voiceless forces of history that do not have direct access to language, but 
which are nevertheless capable of shaking and disturbing dominant forms of representation 
in such a way that opens new possibilities for the future.”13  
Temporal Constructions/Deconstructions 
Within Borges’ texts, multiple modes of temporality are constructed within the 
limitations of knowledge, and then deconstructed, refuted, or contradicted, creating cracks of 
inconsistency, openness, and even limitlessness in the comprehensiveness of time. Borges 
refutes both the singularity and precedence of linear time; he allows for the coexistence of 
contradiction, the concurrence of universalizing time with alternative times, and the presence 
of multiple temporalities in any moment. Within The Garden of Forking Paths, Tlön, Uqbar, 
Orbis Tertius, and A New Refutation of Time, I have identified the interplay of five 
temporalities: internal temporality, material temporality, representative temporality, 
recurrent temporality, and eternal presentness. Internal temporality is an idealist conception 
of an identity in time.  Material temporality and representative temporality are “extent” 
temporalities that exist within the materialist limitations of representation. Recurrent 
temporality and eternal presentness are both temporalities beyond the structural 
containment of linear representation.  
Internal temporality is an individualistic temporal identity; it is the accumulation of “still 
living pasts” and “yet lived futures” that are “in effect” in the present moment. Internal 
temporality reconciles Borges’ “what happens happens to me,” with histories constructed 
within material temporality and representational temporality. Individual selves internalize 
numerous definitive historical moments in the development of a temporal identity, including 
personal experiences, spiritual and mythical attachments, and significant historical events. 
As an individual moves laterally from an “inner” temporal identity to “outer” surrounding 
ideological spheres in which multiple temporal influences converge and conflate in the socio-
spatial present, dominant temporalities emerge which determine the structural dimension of 
behavioral control. As a result, the temporal structure of the socio-spatial present is 
tenuously and consistently vacillated by the passing influence of multiple temporal identities 
within multiple ideological spheres. Therefore, the individuality of “what happens happens to 
me” generates a multiplicity of divergent temporalities existing concurrently in the same 
present moment. 
Material temporality is the search for time in space, meaning the objective collection and 
intellectual dissemination of all objects and spatial associations, from pinheads to Pantheons, 
into a linear history based on historic value and age value as a concrete verification of the 
 
13 Jenckes, Reading Borges after Benjamin, 100. 
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continuity of human existence despite the (non)-passage of time.14 The refutation of material 
temporality is essentially the denial of any linear history constructed by the continuity of 
space in time, which is a central theme of Borges’ work. Borges undermines the continuity of 
space in time through eternal presentness in Tlön, Uqbar, Orbis Tertius and denies linearity 
through recurrent temporality in A New Refutation of Time. Additionally, Borges refutes 
material temporality by blurring the distinction between material history and fiction in Ts’ui 
Pên’s labyrinth of The Garden of Forking Paths. Ts’ui Pên’s labyrinth explores the possibility 
of multiple “diverging, converging, and parallel” strands of time that embrace every 
possibility, both what happened and what could have happened. Because Borges draws no 
distinction between the histories of actual events and the histories of potential non-events, 
the precedence of “having happened” is neutralized. Therefore, the concrete historical 
legitimization of material temporality is nullified in The Garden of Forking Paths. 
Representational temporality is the code of representation (language) through which the 
cognitive realm of past presents and future presents (internal temporality) is abstracted into 
the spatial realm (the linear-temporal sequence of material temporality). In A New 
Refutation of Time, Borges recognizes that the inherent quality of language follows a linear-
temporal sequence: “All language is of a successive nature; it does not lend itself to 
reasoning on eternal, intemporal matters.”15 In other words, language is embedded in the 
structural limitations of its representations, including the constructions of time Borges 
attempts to reject. Borges recognizes his trap, as a writer bound to words chained in time, 
yet attempting to refute time, yet never able to reach the possibility of accessing clarity 
outside of language, and therefore time. In Tlön, Uqbar, Orbis Tertius, Borges ends the story 
by recounting his futile translation of Sir Thomas Browne’s Urn Burial as the real world 
dissolves into Tlön. For Borges, the act is one of defiance, because translation is a material 
representation of thought in space. Ultimately, the translation will become incomprehensible, 
as the structural continuum between space and time disintegrates into a Tlönian 
impossibility.  
Furthermore, Borges often misquotes or invents encyclopedic texts and reference books 
in order to undermine the legitimacy of material temporality and representational 
temporality. The citation of Liddell Hart’s report in the preface of The Garden of Forking 
Paths, upon closer observation, is disorienting and opaque. In comparison to the actual book 
written by Liddell Hart, Borges has slightly altered the book’s title, shifted the month of the 
event, and changed the page number of the citation.16 According to Robert Chibka in the 
“Library of Forking Paths,” The Garden of Forking Paths breaks the binding of any book that 
seems to contain it, sending us through stacks that begin eerily to resemble the Library of 
Babel, full of possibly insignificant variants on indeterminately significant texts.” 17 Like The 
 
14 Alois Riegl defined historic-value as “everything that has been and no longer is…in accordance with the 
modern notion that what has been can never be again, and everything that has been constitutes an 
irreplaceable and irremovable link in a chain of development,” and age-value as “catalysts which trigger in 
the beholder a sense of the life-cycle.” Materials with historic value are specifically related to successive 
development over time, while those with age-value manifest vague associations of the passage of time 
due to their origins. From Alois Reigl, “The Modern Cult of Monuments: It’s Character and Origin,” trans. 
Kurt W. Forester and Diane Ghirardo, Oppositions, No. 25 (Fall 1982): 21-24. 
15 Borges, “A New Refutation of Time,” 68: “Todo lenguaje es de índole sucesiva; no es hábil para razonar 
lo eterno, lo intemporal.” 
16 Robert L. Chibka, “The Library of Forking Paths,” Special Issue: The New Erudition (Autumn, 1996): 
109-110. 
17 Chibka, “The Library of Forking Paths,” 109-110. 
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Garden of Forking Paths, the characters of Tlön, Uqbar, Orbis Tertius are both actual people 
in Borges’ life and imaginary figures. Whereas the imaginary reference in The Garden of 
Forking Paths exists outside of the story in the “real world” of material temporality, in Tlön, 
Uqbar, Orbis Tertius, the “real” encyclopedia becomes a fictional character of the story, but 
the imaginary reference it contains becomes a reality.  By legitimizing fiction through 
material references, Borges blurs the distinction between reality and fantasy, and therefore 
dissolves the legitimization of temporalities within the materialist limitations of 
representation. 
Recurrent temporalities are instances of sameness, near-sameness, repetition, and 
reproduction that interrupt the continuity of linear time and material temporality. In A New 
Refutation of Time, Borges states that the negation of linear time involves two denials: 
“denying the succession of two terms in a series, and denying the synchronism of terms in 
two series.”18 That is to say, one must not only deny linearity, but also that linearity is 
unilateral; one must additionally deny the existence of a single time. Borges continues with a 
description of the uncanny experience of walking down a street from his childhood thirty 
years hence, which had not changed: 
The easy thought I am somewhere in the 1800s ceased to be a few careless words and 
became profoundly real. I felt dead, I felt I was an abstract perceiver of the world, struck 
by an undefined fear imbued with science, or the supreme clarity of metaphysics. No, I 
did not believe I had traversed the presumed waters of Time; rather I suspected that I 
possessed the reticent and absent meaning of the inconceivable word eternity…Now I 
shall transcribe it thus: that pure representation of homogeneous facts- calm night, 
limpid wall, rural scent of honeysuckle, elemental clay- is not merely identical to the 
scene on that corner so many years ago; it is, without similarities or repetitions, the 
same. If we can intuit that sameness, time is a delusion: the impartiality and 
inseparability of one moment of time’s apparent yesterday and another of time’s apparent 
today are enough to make it disintegrate.19 
For Borges, the concept of sameness demonstrates the insubstantial nature of linear 
temporality. Objects having separate spatial-temporal conditions, for Borges, are 
distinguished as two distinct things in both space and time.20  The sameness of the 
“homogeneous facts,” between Borges’ experience and his recollection lack any kind of 
distinction and are therefore the same thing. The basis of their apparent difference, the 
passage of several decades, is meaningless; homogeneous facts exist in space yet outside of 
the historical succession of material temporality. Therefore the homogeneous facts reveal 
linear history as a performance of time, but not time itself. The homogeneous facts do not 
 
18 Borges, “A New Refutation of Time,” 75: “Negar el tiempo es dos negaciones: negar la sucesión de los 
términos de una serie, negar el sincronismo de los términos de dos series.” 
19 Borges, “A New Refutation of Time,” 70: “El fácil pensamiento Estoy en mil ochocientos y tantos dejó 
de ser unas cuantas aproximativas palabras y se profundizó a realidad. Me sentí muerto, me sentí 
percibidor abstracto del mundo; indefinido temor imbuido de ciencia que es la mejor claridad de la 
metafísica. No creí, no, haber remontado las presuntivas aguas del Tiempo; más bien me sospeché 
poseedor del sentido reticente o ausente de la inconcebible palabra eternidad...La escribo, ahora, así: Esa 
pura representación de hechos homogéneos- noche en serenidad, parecita límpida, olor provinciano de la 
madreselva, barro fundamental- no es meramente idéntica a la que hubo es esa esquina hace tantos 
años; es, sin parecidos ni repeticiones, la misma. El tiempo, si podemos intuir esa identidad, es una 
delusión: la indiferencia e inseparabilidad de un momento de su aparente ayer y otro de su aparente hoy, 
basta para desintegrarlo.” 
20 Bossart, Borges and Philosophy, 96. 
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participate in the theater of history, they can not be recognized as belonging to time that has 
passed, time that is, or time that will be: they belong to all three. For Borges, when two 
distinct things are also the same thing, the sameness disintegrates the possibility of 
movement from one spatial-temporal condition to another, and therefore refutes the passage 
of time. And if two distinct things are also the same thing there is no longer a single time 
within which occurrences can be identified in reference to each other, because time 
multiplies exponentially into divergent and convergent temporalities. 
Eternal presentness is the disassociation of time from space. Borges explores eternal 
presentness in Tlön, Uqbar, Orbis Tertius as a refutation of material temporality. In Tlön, any 
affiliation between space and time is nonexistent; events occur in time, but not in space. By 
breaching space from time, the objects in question lack any reference to materiality: they 
exist as purely ideological concepts. Borges extrapolates further with a story of lost objects 
in Tlönians time: 
Two people are looking for a pencil; the first one finds it and says nothing; the second 
finds a pencil, no less real, but more in keeping with his expectation. These secondary 
objects are called hrönir and, even though awkward in form, are a little larger than the 
originals...The methodological development of hrönir…has been of enormous service to 
archaeologists. It has allowed them to question and modify the past, which nowadays is 
no less malleable or obedient than the future.21 
In Tlönian logic, what would be considered to be two found pencils is actually one lost 
pencil and two secondary objects, or hrönir. There is no spatial continuity between the lost 
pencil and the found pencil, only the temporal continuity of the idea of a pencil. Hrönir 
represent the disjointed nature of pure idealism. The concepts in this story return to the 
notion of containment, or the difference between what can be represented within structures 
accessible to cognition and what exists beyond. Borges refutes the ability to spatially locate 
time, and therefore also the self’s understanding of referentiality in time, within the 
structures of representation that he has shown to be inexorably linked to materiality. 
Borgesian Temporality and Contemporaneity 
Borges’ nonlinear temporalities are a reaction against the unilateral linearity of 
historically progressive modernist time. Borges investigates the concept of multiple 
temporalities co-existent in the same time and refutes the exclusivity of linear time. By doing 
so, Borges creates a “space of incompletion” in the totality of modernist temporality. 22 
However, since the early twentieth century, that totality has faded and weakened. From the 
aftermath of modernity’s broken attempt at unity, contemporaneity has emerged as a 
methodology of temporal thought.  According to Terry Smith, “Contemporaneity consists 
precisely in the acceleration, ubiquity, and constancy of radical disjunctures of perception, of 
mismatching ways of seeing and valuing the same world, in the actual coincidence of 
asynchronous temporalities, in the jostling contingency of various cultural and social 
 
21 Borges, “Tlön, Uqbar, Orbis Tertius,” 29-30: “Dos personas buscan un lápiz; la primera lo encuentra y 
no dice nada; la segunda encuentra un segundo lápiz no menos real, pero más ajustado a su expectativa. 
Esos objetos secundarios se llaman hröner y son, aunque de forma desairada, un poco más largos...La 
metódica elaboración de hrönir...ha prestado servicios prodigiosos a los arqueólogos. Ha permitido 
interrogar y hasta modificar el pasado, que ahora no es menos plástico y menos dócil que el provenir.” 
22 Jenckes, Reading Borges After Benjamin, 138. 
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multiplicities, all thrown together in ways that highlight the fast-growing inequalities within 
and between them.” 23  
Have Borges’ nonlinear refutations been eclipsed by the emergence of contemporaneity, 
or is Borges’ work transcendent as a critique of temporal perceptions? This question is 
layered with many queries about the nature of time and temporal cognizance. Is there any 
distinction between one moment and another beyond limited constructions of history? Can 
the content of temporality change in different times, or is it structure of temporality that 
changes? Or is it the frequency of temporality that changes and it is the content that is 
repeated? If one group of people constructs temporality through any of the methodologies 
elaborated by Borges, what is to say that all peoples of the past and future have not also 
done so, and will not also do so, at least in some combination? In other words, what is 
universal about the sensation of time, and what is limited by historically specific collective 
temporal constructions? 
On one hand, many of Borges’ perceptions of multiple convergent and divergent 
temporalities are deceptively similar to the theory of contemporaneity. The concept of 
multiple concurrent temporalities in effect on a global scale can be understood on Borgesian 
terms as multiple temporalities in effect in the self, and then constructed into socio-collective 
drifts of time. Borges is extrapolating the structural relationship between sensations of time 
“inside one’s head,” and the collective construction of temporality “outside of one’s head.” By 
doing so, Borges expands nature of temporal understanding beyond the unilateral structural 
constraints of modernism, and can be understood as a methodology for theorizing about the 
asynchronous multiplicity of contemporaneity. Furthermore, the temporal flow between 
modernity and contemporaneity is a continuum, rather than a rupture. Therefore, the 
absolutist historical progression of modernist temporality is contemporarily relevant, if only 
as one of many aspects of Harry Hartoonunian’s concept of the thickened present, “a present 
filled with traces of different moments and temporalities” from the past.24   
On the other hand, contemporaneity is conceptually a universal multiplicity, whereas 
Borges’ temporality is a refutation of a totality and a symptom of modernity. According to 
Smith, contemporaneity is not an entry point or evidence of a greater totality, but is instead 
a conceptualization of temporality in which the particular has become the general.25 
However, Borges often negates totality by inverting time, creating an internal self-negating 
cycle, which is both a totality and the opposite of totality, and therefore not yet released 
from totality. As Borges’s deconstructions negate modernist time, constructions of the past 
and future generate an eternally referential “happens now” and in effect carve modernist 
time out of negated time. This time, which is then negated again by Borges’s time, in turn 
negates eternity onto itself by the process of its present non-presentness. Borges’ negated 
time is therefore encapsulated in a paradox that cannot be separated from modernist time. 
Though Borgesian temporalities are an aspect of contemporaneity, contemporaneity also 
involves multiplicities of temporality beyond the Borgesian web. 
The critical distinction lies between Borges’ negation of modernist time and Borges’ 
understanding of the relationship between the internal sensation of time and external 
 
23 Terry Smith, “Introduction: The Contemporaneity Question,” in Antinomies of Art and Culture: 
Modernity, Postmodernity, Contemporaneity, ed. Terry Smith, Okuwui Enwezor, and Nancy Condee  
(Durham: Duke University Press, 2008), 8-9. 
24 Harry Hartoonunian, “Remembering the Historical Present,” Critical Inquiry, 33, No. 3 (Spring, 2007): 
476. 
25 Smith, “Introduction: The Contemporaneity Question,” 9. 
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collective constructions of time: the former is deeply embedded in modernism, yet the latter 
deals with the universal human experience of time. Borgesian temporality is both a mirror of 
modernist time and a transcendent exploration of contemporaneous temporalities. Within the 
cracks of modernity, Borgesian time manifests an “either/or” relationship between the self 
and temporality. Contemporaneously, however, Borgesian time coalesces into a “both/and” 
relationship between the self, structural temporality, and a web of enmeshed and divergent 
interpretations of time. 
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